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On a clear day you can see forever:
Integrating values and skills in sex offender
treatment
Tony Ward*
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
Abstract The topic of sex offender rehabilitation frequently evokes fierce reactions, ranging from
strident demands for harsher sentences contrasted with calls for more imaginative and compassionate
sentencing options. There seems to be a polarization of positions centred on the question of offenders’
moral standing: are they moral strangers or fellow travellers? This fundamental disagreement about
offenders’ moral status is at the core of a number of independent, although related current practice and
research issues confronting the field, namely: (1) risk management versus strength-based treatment
approaches; (2) the utility of utilizing individually tailored versus manual-based programmes for
offenders; (3) focusing on the technical aspects or therapy as opposed to relationship and therapist
factors (what has been called process issues); and (4) the conflict between protecting the community
versus promoting the interests of offenders. In this paper I suggest that an approach to sex offender
treatment based on a combination of human rights theory (an ethical resource) and strengths-based
approaches can help us navigate our way through the above dilemmas in a way that addressees both
the needs of offenders and those of the community.
Keywords Sex offenders; human rights; therapy issues
Introduction
The topic of sex offender rehabilitation frequently evokes fierce reactions, ranging from
strident demands for harsher sentences contrasted with calls for more imaginative and
compassionate sentencing options. There seems to be a polarization of positions centred on
the question of offenders’ moral standing: are they moral strangers or fellow travellers? In
other words, an important question is whether we should view sex offenders primarily as
bearers of risk whose potential for inflicting harm on the community should always be at the
foremost of our minds when formulating correctional policy. Alternatively, should we regard
offenders as human rights holders who retain their basic dignity and value as human beings
despite the inevitable curtailment of some of their liberty rights?
In my view this fundamental disagreement about offenders’ moral status (Ward &
Birgden, 2007; Ward, Gannon & Birgden, 2007) is at the core of a number of independent
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although related current practice and research issues confronting the field: (1) risk manage-
ment versus strength-based treatment approaches; (2) the utility of utilizing individually
tailored versus manual-based programmes for offenders; (3) focusing on the technical as-
pects or therapy as opposed to relationship and therapist factors (what has been called
‘process issues’); and (4) the conflict between protecting the community versus promoting the
interests of offenders. In my experience, these four issues are typically presented as dilemmas
(one has to accept one or the other where neither is entirely satisfactory) where therapists
gravitate towards one pole of each issue and therefore may adopt quite extreme positions. For
example, a therapist may view effective sex offender treatment as entirely a matter of
concentrating on implementing specific techniques rather than attending to the quality of the
therapeutic alliance. Although the four issues are conceptually independent, in practice
therapists views tend to be clustered together in the following way: (a) risk management,
manual-based, focus on technique and community protection as opposed to (b) strength-
orientated, individual tailoring, emphasis on the therapeutic alliance and concern with
offender rights. According to the former cluster, sex offenders present essentially as
constellations of risk factors to be managed and somehow contained, while from the
perspective of the second cluster their offending is seen as related directly or indirectly to the
pursuit of primary human goods (i.e. related to need fulfilment).
My argument in this paper is quite straightforward. Alongside disputed matters of fact,
there is a value dimension underlying the four assessment and treatment-related issues I have
outlined above. The implicit nature of the value dimensions means that participants debating
these issues tend to speak past each other and end up feeling that they have been
misinterpreted and misunderstood. As a consequence of the inevitable frustrations in which
such miscommunication results, there has been a lack of progress in our field and a real
danger that a fracture will appear between supporters of the two broad positions outlined
above. This is clearly not in the interests of the community, practitioners or the offenders
themselves. I propose that the issues should be viewed in dimensional terms rather than as
opposite sides of dilemmas and that ethical, effective practice should incorporate both ‘‘poles’’
of each of the four dimensions. The degree to which one end or the other of the dimensions is
emphasized will depend on the contextual features of individual cases and should not be
determined by the mechanical application of a rigid set of rules. I suggest that an approach to
sex offender treatment based on a combination of human rights theory (an ethical resource)
and strengths-based approaches can help us to navigate our way through the above dilemmas
in a way that addressees both the needs of offenders and those of the community. According
to this argument, human rights function as an ethical scaffold that can structure the process and
implementation of sex offender treatment and safeguard offenders’ entitlements, protect the
community, address individual clinical need and enhance therapeutic process.
First, I describe briefly both poles of each of the four therapeutic ‘‘dilemmas’’,
considering their overall clinical implications. Secondly, I discuss briefly the nature of human
rights and their therapeutic utility. Thirdly, I revisit the four issues and demonstrate how a
combination of human rights and a capability-building approach can assist in finding a more
balanced approach to treatment that incorporates the advantages of each end of the
dimensions. Because of the nature of an overview paper such as this, my characterizations
of each of the four issues/dimensions will be necessarily brief. I will attempt to provide some
theoretical and research evidence for each of the positions discussed but cannot do so in a
systematic manner due to space limitations.
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The four practice dilemmas
Risk management versus strength-based approaches
The RiskNeedResponsivity (RNR) model of offender rehabilitation is deservedly the
premier treatment model for offenders generally and is an exemplar of the risk management
approach (see Andrews & Bonta, 2003). It has constituted a revolution in the way criminal
conduct is managed in Canada, Britain, Europe, Australia and New Zealand and has led to
the development of a suite of empirically derived interventions for a range of crimes. In brief,
the risk principle suggests that offenders at higher risk of re-offending will benefit more from
higher levels of intervention, including high-intensity treatment, than will lower-risk
offenders. The need principle proposes that those variables associated with reductions in
recidivism (i.e. dynamic risk factors or criminogenic needs) should be targeted to maximize
the likelihood of reducing recidivism. The responsivity principle states that correctional
programmes should be matched to offender characteristics such as learning style, level of
motivation and the individual’s personal and interpersonal circumstances, in order to ensure
that intervention is personally relevant and to maximize engagement with treatment.
The first two principles (risk and need) are used to select treatment intensity and targets,
and the whole set of principles is used to guide the way practice is actually implemented. A
fourth principle, the principle of professional discretion, states that clinical judgement should
override the above principles if circumstances warrant. This principle allows for treatment
flexibility and innovation under certain circumstances, as in cases in which an individual
indicates explicitly a plan to offend against a specific victim, or when an offender is
incapacitated and unable to carry out offending, regardless of assessed level of risk.
An impressive body of meta-analytical research has been conducted on the RNR model
with a wide range of offenders. This evidence has largely been derived from retrospective
meta-analytical examination of rehabilitation evaluation research and there has also been a
recent application of the RNR principles to sex offenders by Hanson (2006). Core values
associated with this approach are those of community protection, efficient treatment delivery,
a view of offenders as bearers of risk and an emphasis on the rights on non-offenders. In short,
sex offenders are construed as embodiments of discrete risk factors who pose considerable
harm to the community. There is no acknowledgement of their status as fellow human beings
or particular interest in promoting their wellbeing.
In recent years, clinicians and researchers have challenged certain aspects of the RNR
model and have argued that concentrating on reducing dynamic risk factors (criminogenic
needs) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective correctional interventions
(Maruna, 2001; Ward & Stewart, 2003). One of the major concerns is the perceived
narrowness of the RNR model and its failure to adopt a more constructive or strengths-based
approach to treatment. It has been argued that it is necessary to broaden the scope of
correctional interventions to take into account the promotion of human goods (i.e. approach
goals as well as avoidance goals). Such approach goals include experiences, activities or states
of affairs that are associated strongly with a person’s wellbeing and higher levels of personal
satisfaction and social functioning.
The most systematically developed theory in the strengths-based domain is probably
Ward and colleagues’ Good Lives Model (GLM*see Ward & Brown, 2004; Ward & Gannon,
2006; Ward & Maruna, 2007; Ward & Stewart, 2003). The GLM is based around two core
therapeutic goals: to promote human goods and to reduce risk. According to Ward and his
colleagues, a focus on the promotion of specific goods or goals in the treatment of offenders is
likely to eliminate (or reduce) automatically commonly targeted dynamic risk factors (or
criminogenic needs). By contrast, they argue that focusing only on the reduction of risk factors
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is unlikely to promote the full range of specific goods and goals necessary for longer-term
desistence from offending.
Strength-based approaches such as the GLM of offender rehabilitation focus on the
utilization of offenders’ primary goods or values in the design of intervention programmes and
aim to equip them with the capabilities necessary to implement a better life plan founded on
these values. The GLM is a therapeutic perspective based on the pursuit of better lives; ways
of living that are constructed around core values and concrete means of realizing their goals in
certain environments (Ward & Stewart, 2003).
The values associated with strength-based approaches include a commitment to the core
interests and well-being of all human beings including offenders, a communitarian focus, an
emphasis on adopting a holistic view of sex offender treatment and a focus on human dignity
and agency. The value contrast between the two poles of the dimension revolves essentially
around accepting the equal value and dignity of offenders and members of the community. A
major aim should be to ensure that both have the essential capabilities to live better lives
rather than insisting on quarantining offenders to ensure the safety of the rest of society.
Tailored versus manual-based programmes
In conjunction with the three primary RNR principles, Andrews and Bonta (2003) stress that
there are six main elements required in correctional programmes if they are to be effective.
Specifically, they must be: (1) cognitivebehavioural in orientation; (2) highly structured,
specifying the aims and tasks to be covered in each session; (3) implemented by trained,
qualified and appropriately supervised staff; (4) delivered in the correct manner and as
intended by programme developers to ensure treatment integrity; (5) manual-based; and (6)
delivered in settings with personnel committed to the ideals of rehabilitation and a
management structure that supports rehabilitation and programme integrity (Andrews &
Bonta, 2003). Thus, delivering treatment programmes in a systematic, structured and reliable
manner is likely to result in greater treatment gains. There has been a corresponding emphasis
on manual based programmes in the sexual offending area although some researchers have
cautioned against a rigid mechanical approach to treatment delivery (e.g. Marshall, Marshall,
Serran & Fernadez, 2006).
Primary values associated with the issue of manual-orientated treatment approaches are
those of efficiency, objectivity (impartiality), greater utility (i.e. maximizing outcomes),
universality and reliability. The offender is again viewed as a risk to be managed carefully and
there is an implicit assumption that the therapist’s judgement is often unreliable and, unless
corrected by objective methods, is likely to result in suboptimal therapy. There is a shift of
focus from that of meaning to that of causality.
A critical response to manual-based programmes is that sometimes they can become
overly prescriptive and inflexible and do not allow for individual adjustments to be made when
needed (Ward & Maruna, 2007). Alongside this crucial observation has been the discovery
that sex offenders typically follow different offence trajectories and present with a diverse array
of risk factors and treatment needs (Beech & Ward, 2004; Hanson & Harris, 2000; Yates,
2003). For example, recent research suggests that, while some sexual offenders commit their
offences as a result of self-regulatory failure, others do so via careful and systematic planning
(Laws, 2003; Ward et al., 2004). As a result of this research, Ward and Hudson (2000)
developed an alternative approach to the treatment of sexual offenders, based on self-
regulation theory. The self-regulation model (SRM) of offending was developed explicitly to
account for the variety of offence pathways evident in sexual offenders and to provide
therapists with a more comprehensive treatment model (Ward, et al., 2004). In brief, the
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SRM contains four pathways, representing different combinations of offence-related goals
(i.e. is the aim to approach or avoid the sexual offence), and the use of distinct self-regulation
styles in relation to sexually offensive contact (under-regulation, misregulation and effective
regulation). The major clinical implication of this research has been a call to move away from
a one-size-fits-all approach to an appreciation of the need to adopt interventions to match
offenders’ individual constellations of vulnerability factors.
The core values associated with an increased emphasis on treatment tailoring are the
importance of individual agency, treatment flexibility and equality of treatment consideration.
The key value contrast between the two poles of this dimension is that between approaching
sex offender treatment from the perspective of the individual offender rather than that of only
maximizing outcome for the benefit of the community.
Technical versus process focus
The third area of dispute concerns the degree to which therapists should focus on the
therapeutic relationship with offenders as opposed to empirically derived treatment targets
(Beech & Fordham, 1997). On one hand, there is increasing evidence from risk assessment
and research on aetiology that a number of stable dynamic factors appear to be related
causally to offending and if directly targeted in treatment are likely to result in reduced
recidivism rates. The stable dynamic factors include (1) sexual interests/sexual self-regulation;
(2) attitudes supportive of sexual assault; (3) interpersonal functioning; and (4) emotional
ability (Beech & Ward, 2004; Hanson & Harris, 2000). It is therefore argued that sex offender
treatment should be focused entirely on these criminogenic needs and involves the delivery of
specific techniques shown to be effective to modifying or eliminating them. The values
associated with this perspective are those of objectivity, community protection, efficiency and
impartiality.
On the other hand, research has increasingly noted the crucial importance of therapist
and therapy (process) factors in producing good outcomes with sex offenders (Marshall et al.,
2006). These factors include: the ability of the therapists to create an appropriate alliance with
the offender; the inculcation of the possibility for change; ensuring that the offender will
benefit positively from such changes; providing the offender with an opportunity to learn from
therapy; and emotionally engaging individuals in treatment. Thus, research indicates that
efforts to increase offenders’ self-esteem are likely to facilitate the primary targets of therapy
and working collaboratively with offenders in developing treatment goals may result in a
stronger therapeutic alliance (Mann et al., 2004). Furthermore, empathetic, warm therapists
who encourage and reward progress appear to be the most effective in motivating change
(Marshall et al., 2003). The values associated with a stress on process factors include a
concern for offender wellbeing, respect for the dignity and agency of the offender, an
emphasis on interpersonal meaning and the need to understand the life goals of offenders. It is
clear that a major contrast between the underlying values of the two poles of this dimension
concerns an appreciation of the degree to which individuals are interdependent and the
necessity of understanding the unique viewpoints of both therapists and offenders when
planning and delivering therapy.
Community protection versus offenders’ wellbeing
Public and correctional policies increasingly stress the protection of the community from
offenders and have imposed tougher sentences and stricter parole conditions on offenders
(Ward & Birdgen, 2007). There has been a tendency to discount rights of offenders and view
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them as risk-bearers, rather than human beings with inherent dignity and the basic rights to
freedom and well-being that all individuals possess. The community appears to be extremely
risk-aversive and all that seems to matter is whether the streets are safe and whether offenders
are quarantined securely away from other people (Ward & Maruna, 2007). The emphasis on
community protection is neatly captured by Vess:
In contrast to the justice model, the community protection approach is less concerned
about due process, the proportionality of punishment to the crime, and the protection of
offenders’ liberty or privacy rights. In contrast to the forensicclinical model, it is less
concerned about treatment or rehabilitation of offenders intended to reduce recidivism or
facilitate community reintegration. The primary goal of the community protection model
is the incapacitation of sexual offenders for the sake of public safety (Vess, 2005, p. 360).
The core values associated with the community protection orientation are non-offenders’
safety and rights, the obligations of offenders, predictability and control and community harm
reduction. Sex offenders are construed as of less intrinsic value than non-offenders who have
somehow forfeited their freedom and some of their well-being rights (Ward & Birgden, 2007).
By way of contrast, a comprehensive human rights perspective is concerned about
ensuring equal treatment and consideration of offenders in conjunction with ensuring the
safety of members of the community. A crucial issue when applying a human rights
perspective to offenders on community-based orders or parole is to make sure that the
conditions imposed on them are respectful of their human rights and agency and do not
unduly restrict their freedom of movement or association or prevent the acquisition of the
well-being goods required to effectively further their valued projects. Unnecessarily harsh
restrictions may make it extremely difficult for offenders in the community to live lives of
minimal dignity and may diminish their wellbeing to a serious degree. Offenders may find it
difficult to establish supportive relationships with other people or to develop their interests
and personality in healthy directions. For example, laws and policies that legislate intensive
monitoring and control of sex offenders may result in individuals being unable to relocate
themselves into social networks and to establish adaptive ways of meeting their needs. A risk-
aversive society in effect quarantines offenders and by so doing leads to: (a) exaggerated
public fears and anxiety about personal safety; (b) social exclusion of offenders; and (c)
increased risk because of offenders’ lack of opportunities to pursue rewarding, prosocial
lifestyles. Paradoxically, the combination of social stigmatization and an exaggerated notion of
risk can increase the chances of re-offending (Ward & Maruna, 2007).
The primary values associated with the concern of offenders’ rights are those of
redemption, community reintegration, forgiveness, offender entitlements, community obliga-
tions to offenders and individual dignity. A point of contrast with the community protection
perspective is a concern to address offenders’ core interests alongside those of the rest of
society. Sex offenders are regarded as fellow human beings with the same fundamental rights
and intrinsic dignity as all of us, although some of their freedom rights may be justifiably
curtailed in specific circumstances.
Clinical implications
The existence of the four current practice ‘‘dilemmas’’ noted above has resulted in a tendency
of practitioners to swing from one extreme to another rather than to adopt a more balanced
approach. For example, at times there has been a focus on technique at the expense of the
therapeutic alliance or on community protection as opposed to offender welfare. The problem
192 T. Ward
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
2:
11
 1
6 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
is not that clinicians are unreflective and lacking resourcefulness*far from it. The key issue is
that the debate has been conducted without sufficient awareness of the value dimensions and
instead has focused on matters of empirical adequacy. In my view, what is required is a more
nuanced approach*a middle way that is guided by a sound ethical framework and explicit
awareness of the value dimension inherent in offender rehabilitation.
In essence, the rehabilitation of sex offenders is an evaluative and capability-building
process that is concerned with promoting primary goods and managing risk. At the heart of
this process is the construction of a more adaptive narrative identity and the acquisition of
capabilities that enable offenders to secure important values in their post release environ-
ments. From the strengths- and evidence-based perspective the aim is to ensure that
interventions are delivered in ways that are likely to reduce risk and to enhance offenders’
well-being. Therapy is seen therefore as an activity that should add to an offender’s repertoire
of personal functioning, rather than an activity that simply removes a problem or is devoted to
managing problems, as if a lifetime of grossly restricting one’s activity is the only way to avoid
offending (Ward, Mann & Gannon, 2007). I will now turn to analysis of human rights before
returning to the four practice dilemmas described above.
What are human rights?
In order to define human rights it is first necessary to analyse the concept of a right. Following
Hohfeld (1919), a right is a claim for specific human goods made against another person or
the State who thereby has a duty to provide the good claimed. A right may be broken down
into a number of key concepts: a rights-holder (i.e. the moral agent who makes the claim), the
assertion of a claim, the object of the claim (e.g. free speech or liberty), a recipient called upon
to provide the object in question (i.e. the duty-bearer) and the grounds or justification for the
claim in question. Rights in this sense are viewed as entitlements to non-interference from
others in the agent’s affairs and/or to the provision of goods that are seen as being owed to the
person concerned. Rights involve duties or obligations; the recipient of the claim therefore has
a duty to provide the claimant with the object in question (Gewirth, 1981; Orend, 2002).
Individuals hold human rights simply because they are members of the human race and
as such are considered to be moral agents. Moral agents are individuals capable of formulating
their own personal goals and seeking ways of realizing them in their day-to-day lives. The
relationship between values and human rights is described well by Michael Freeden (1991),
who argues that human rights are intended to function as protective capsules that bestow a
defensive zone around individuals so that they can get on with the business of leading good
and meaningful lives. That is, a life that is chosen by them and that involves the unfolding of
personal projects embodying their particular commitments. Human rights protect what are
considered to be essential attributes of human beings: needs, capacities and interests that if
guaranteed respect their dignity as persons and if violated result in diminished lives
(Nussbaum, 2006; Orend, 2002).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) consists of a preamble asserting
the dignity of human beings and 30 articles articulating specific rights to objects such as
freedom from torture, security of the person, a fair trial and due process, right to own
property, freedom to and from discrimination, freedom to marry, the right to work, religious
freedom and so on (United Nations, 1948). The UDHR was followed by two international
covenants in 1966 (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights) that provided more detail on the various
articles outlined in the original United Nations declaration (Freeman, 2002).
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Following Orend (2002), it is possible to group the various rights contained in the
UDHR into five clusters, each cluster associated with a particular object (i.e. a target of
human rights, the value or good protected): personal freedom, material subsistence, personal
security, elemental equality and social recognition. The human right of personal freedom
refers to a subset of rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, movement, association,
conscience and religion and is associated with a number of the specific rights contained in the
UDHR. Furthermore, it is directly linked to individuals’ right to rely on their own judgement
when deciding how to live their lives. The human right of security concerns the physical safety
and welfare of individuals and includes more fine-grained rights such as freedom from torture,
violence, due process rights in law and rights to seek asylum. The right to subsistence refers to
a subset of objects including rights to basic levels of physical health, food, water and
education. Equality denotes goods such as equality before the law and freedom from
discrimination on the grounds of religion, gender, disability or some other feature considered
to be irrelevant for the ascription of individuals’ moral status. Finally, social recognition is
concerned essentially with acknowledging individuals’ rights to direct the course of their own
lives and to be treated in a dignified and respectful manner in accordance with their status as
autonomous agents. Self-respect and self-esteem are included under this category and point
to the importance of individuals possessing positive attitudes toward themselves and their own
lives (in a sense, this is the internal component of human dignity). Thus, according to the
UDHR and the two covenants, human rights are universal entitlements to certain goods that,
if obtained, will result in at least minimally decent and dignified human lives.
Justification of human rights
The work of Alan Gewirth (1981, 1996, 1998) provides an elegant argument for the use of
human rights. He argues that every agent must accept that s/he has rights to the core values of
well-being and freedom, as without these objects human functioning would probably be
ineffective (Churchill, 2006). Once this is accepted it follows logically that every agent must
accept that other people have the same rights to freedom and well-being.
In terms of the first step, Gewirth asks prospective agents to consider the value of the
goals or objectives of their potential actions. On reflection, it is clear that any ends that
individuals aim to achieve intentionally must have value for them or otherwise they would not
bother to seek them. Furthermore, it follows that prospective agents must also accept that any
conditions that are required to accomplish their goals will be viewed as having value because
of the necessary relationship to their ends. Gewirth argues that individuals have rights to
whatever is necessary to achieve the purposes of their actions because without such guarantees
they may not be able to function effectively at all (i.e. they will be unable to realize their goals
successfully). Freedom to act is necessary, otherwise individuals would not be able achieve
their own goals. Freedom involves the ability to act upon the basis of a person’s particular
intentions. This means being able to have access to the relevant information needed to make a
decision, consider the possible options, formulate a plan and then to implement the plan
without interference from other people. Well-being is required because in order to act at all
people require a certain level of physical and mental well-being and access to various social,
material and psychological resources or goods: mental equilibrium, education, physical
health, self-esteem, knowledge, opportunities, social supports, not being lied to, and so on (a
consequential argument). In light of these considerations, Gewirth asserts that freedom and
well-being are necessary conditions for the attainment of aims and therefore justify agents’
rights to these goods.
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Once the arguments for freedom and well-being have been accepted, Gewirth asserts that
if one grants these rights to oneself, because of the principle of universality one must also
grant them to other prospective agents. Other people share your need for freedom and well-
being if they are to attain their desired objectives. They are also prospective purposive agents
who value their own goals and require the goods of freedom and well-being to be able
to act in pursuit of these ends. The denial of the rights to freedom and well-being to other
people amounts to a denial of their dignity and worth as moral agents. Human dignity follows
from achieving outcomes that you desire and being able to fulfil your preferences. The two
essential conditions of well-being and freedom enable most adults to achieve this outcome.
Structure of human rights
It is useful to distinguish between the core values protected by human rights and their
ultimate operationalization into more specific rights evident in documents such as the UDHR
(Ward & Birgden, 2007). The movement from core values to specific ones is one of decreasing
abstraction, from extremely intangible values and rights to quite specific rights such as the
entitlement to paid holidays. In our model (Ward & Birgden, 2007) there are three layers to
human rights: the core values of freedom and well-being protected by rights and a justificatory
theory (Gewirth, 1981, 1996, 1998), their unpacking into further subsets of rights or goods
(Orend, 2002) and specific human rights specifications or policies outlined in documents
such as the UDHR. The critical issue is to make sure that the rights specified in covenants and
declarations are always approached in light of human rights objects and core values. Failure to
do so will make the various lists of human rights appear to be arbitrary and overly specific and
prescriptive. It goes without saying that corresponding to each of the three layers of our model
of human rights are corresponding duties to respect the stated rights (we have drawn from the
work of the following theorists in developing our model: Li, 2006; Orend, 2002; Rescher,
1993).
Freedom and well-being constitute the core values (inner layer) required for individuals
to be able to function as purposive agents and as such establish human dignity. The middle
layer in the human rights model concerns the elaboration of the two primary core values of
freedom and well-being. In our view, these two values are able to be unpacked into the five
human rights objects formulated by Orend (2002) in the following way; the objects of
security, subsistence and equality can be incorporated into well-being, and recognition and
freedom can be incorporated into freedom. According to our analysis, all humans hold rights
to all five human rights objects and others hold corresponding duties to ensure that these
rights are able to be exercised. The outer layer in the human rights model is that of human
rights policies. This involves the codification of the more abstract values and rights into
specific lists of human rights. Declarations of human rights such as the UDHR are excellent
examples of such lists and provide normative guidance to the State, agencies and individuals
concerning their duties to human beings within their country and in other parts of the world.
A key insight of this human rights model is that the moral justification and basis for
human rights ascriptions resides in the core values and their justifying theory (i.e. Gewirth’s
agency theory and the attendant notion of human dignity). Another important implication of
this approach is that there are rights and duties at the various levels, but they become
increasingly prescribed through policy as one moves outwards from the inner layer. That is,
there is less room for individual judgement and interpretation of the specific rights and their
duties at the more concrete level*the level of treaties, declaration, agency policies, and so on.
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Human rights and practice with sex offenders
From a human rights perspective, sex offender treatment should aim to help individuals
achieve as normal a level of functioning as possible and should place restrictions on activities
only that are highly related to problematic behaviour. Thus, a man who raped an adult woman
might be encouraged to avoid certain situations in his future life, but should not be expected
to give up any hopes of developing an intimate relationship by being told to avoid all situations
where single women might be present. In other words, a more holistic treatment perspective is
taken, based on the core idea that the best way to reduce risk is by helping offenders to live
more fulfilling lives. In addition, therapy is tailored to each offender’s ‘‘good lives’’ plan while
still being administered in a systematic and structured way. It is envisaged that offenders need
undertake only those treatment activities that provide the ingredients of their particular plan.
In addition to this focus on a better fit between therapy and the offender’s specific issues,
abilities, preferences and contexts, greater attention is also paid to the development of a
therapeutic alliance and the process of therapy. Furthermore, risk factors are regarded as
internal and external obstacles that make it difficult for an individual to implement a good
lives plan in a socially acceptable and personally fulfilling manner. Thus, a major focus is on
the establishment of the skills and competencies needed to achieve a better kind of life,
alongside the management of risk.
Looking at the treatment process more directly, I suggest that human rights should be
factored into therapy in two major ways: (a) programme delivery and (b) programme design
and content.
First, a human rights perspective makes it easier for practitioners to develop strong
collaborative relationships with offenders therefore ensuring better outcomes. Human rights
are protective capsules that strengthen valued aspects of human functioning such as freedom
and the various components of well-being, including basic needs, education, mastery and self-
esteem. Human rights represent entitlements to the necessary conditions of effective action
required for individuals to pursue and implement their personal projects successfully. The
dignity inherent in effective action and the realization of personal projects means that
offenders will respond well to practitioners who acknowledge their rights to make important
decisions for themselves and their value as human beings. Thus, by virtue of an emphasis on
the rights of individuals to freedom (qualified of course) and the degree of well-being
necessary to act successfully, adherence to human rights norms is likely to facilitate the change
process and to result in higher levels of cooperation and motivation on the part of offenders.
The second intervention issue relates to the design and content of the various modules
offered to individuals within the criminal justice system. I propose that interventions should
seek to strengthen and equip sex offenders with the capabilities to exercise their freedom and
well-being rights, depending upon the resources available to agencies. The State has a duty to
ensure that its citizens have the levels of freedom and well-being essential to act effectively in
the world if the individuals themselves are unable to provide these conditions for themselves.
The basic components underlying freedom such as the capacity to form and make
judgements, the ability to problem-solve, to attain reasonable physical and mental heath,
education, and so on, are the kinds of goods that are presupposed by effective action and
therefore individuals cannot be expected to acquire these goods entirely on their own. In
the case of sex offenders, histories of severe neglect, abuse and inadequate socialization
often mean that they are ill-equipped to achieve successfully important goals in socially
acceptable ways. The lack of the fundamental capabilities needed to function adequately in
the community essentially hinders individuals and makes it more likely that they will
experience a range of psychological and social problems.
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The human rights objects of personal freedom, material subsistence, personal security,
elemental equality and social recognition consideration should guide both the content of
specific modules and process of intervention. The relationship between risk and good
promotion should enable workers to ensure respect for basic human rights and also reduce
risk (i.e. respect the rights of others). This is an advantage of strengths-based approaches such
as the GLM and a disadvantage of the RNR model (Ward & Maruna, 2007).
It is arguable that the various modules offered to sex offenders actually help them to
acquire the capabilities necessary to exercise their human rights and therefore to function as
purposive agents. These modules include problem-solving, cognitive skills, social and
intimacy skills, affect regulation, understanding offendingreflective agency, lifestyle planning
(relapse prevention), empathy and cognitive restructuring. Participating in treatment
programmes that contain modules such as these is likely to help offenders to both
acknowledge others’ rights and value as human beings, as well as to enable them to pursue
their own personal projects in socially acceptable ways. Thus, a human rights perspective
provides practitioners with an ethical framework (prudential and moral) that allows them to
select the therapy skills required and to deliver them in ways responsive to offenders’ unique
issues and needs.
Human rights and the four dilemmas: A balanced approach
It is now time to revisit the four practice dilemmas in light of the human rights model outlined
above and the capabilities approach to offender treatment. To recall, human rights seek
to protect the core conditions for human agency and treatments sets out to ensure that
the internal and external conditions required to achieve this aim are provided. In brief, I argue
that the mixture of human rights and their associated capabilities provides therapists with the
necessary resources to navigate a way through the practice dilemmas. The combination of
cognitive resources provides therapists with a normative formwork to guide the assessment,
treatment and ongoing monitoring of sex offenders. I will now consider briefly each of the
practice problems in light of these ideas.
Risk management versus strength-based approaches
The establishment of the competencies and resources required to strengthen offenders’
capacity to function as purposive agents is likely to reduce their specific risk factors. I propose
that the pursuit of primary human goods is implicated in the aetiology of sexual offending.
Offenders by virtue of possessing the same needs and nature as the rest of us, search actively
for primary human goods in their environments (e.g. relationships, mastery experiences, a
sense of belonging, a sense of purpose and autonomy). In some circumstances (e.g. through
lack of internal skills and external conditions), this can lead to antisocial behaviour. I argue
that therapeutic actions that promote approach goals (e.g. pursuit of goods) will also help to
secure avoidance goals (e.g. reduction of risk). The reason this occurs is because of the
aetiological role that goods play in offending and also because equipping individuals with the
internal and external conditions necessary to effectively implement a good lives plan (i.e. a
plan that contains all the primary goods and ways of achieving them that match the offenders’
abilities, preferences and environment) will also modify their criminogenic needs. Further-
more, it is easier to motivate offenders to change their offence-related characteristics by
focusing on the perceived benefits (primary goods) they accrue from their offending and
exploring more appropriate means (secondary goods) to achieve what is of value to offenders.
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For example, the dynamic risk factor (a criminogenic need) of impulsivity indicates that a
person lacks self-control skills and is therefore unable to function as a self-regulating,
autonomous agent. He will find it difficult to achieve valued goals because of a failure to do
one of the following: reflect on his situation, develop a plan to secure the goods that will meet
his needs, put the plan into action in a specific environment and evaluate the adequacy of his
plan and revise it if necessary. Therapeutic interventions that are designed to remedy offender
autonomy deficits will consequently instil in the individual the internal and external
conditions required to self-regulate behaviour. This will enable the offender to realize the
good of autonomy and other important goods that require agency skills (e.g. emotional
regulation, effective relationships and mastery of certain work tasks).
Therefore, equipping offenders with the skills and resources to pursue their personal
goals will help them to acquire the ability to effectively self-regulate. Their entitlements as
human beings means that therapists should endeavour to help them to pursue their own
conception of good life provided that they also respect the rights of others in the process.
Rights guarantee individuals certain entitlements but also impose obligations to recognize the
interests of others. Adopting a human rights perspective with its attendant idea of agency
strengthening means that it is possible to reduce risk, establish offender competencies and
respond to individuals’ preferences and talents all at the same time.
Manual-based versus tailored treatment programmes
A human rights approach stipulates that offenders’ core interests ought to be respected and
their capacity to function as purposive agents enhanced. This is achieved by ensuring that
certain freedom and well-being goods are available to offenders; conditions that will facilitate
the pursuit and realization of individually tailored good lives plans. The achievement of such
plans will, however, depend on the possession of core competencies and opportunities that are
established through the delivery of therapeutic strategies that have been shown to be effective.
The manual-based component is likely to be required to make sure that treatment is delivered
in ways likely to effect change while attention to offender-specific good lives plans means that
some degree of tailoring is needed as well. The whole process is built around respecting
human rights entitlements and obligations while focusing on equipping offenders with the
required self-regulation (agency) competencies and opportunities to implement their own life
plans. Thus, standard cognitivebehavioural therapy (CBT) techniques are recruited to build
skills, reduce risk (etc.) in the service of individuals’ personal goals; goals that are personally
meaningful to sex offenders and socially acceptable.
Technical versus process focus
Human rights are intended to provide and protect the internal and external conditions
required for agency and dignity. It is the exercise of agency that bestows dignity upon human
beings, the fact that people are able to translate their ideals and dreams into effective action,
and by so doing give their lives shape and meaning. Therefore, the skill component of therapy
is always in service of offenders’ and others’ inherent value: the aim is to use the array of
techniques in a therapist’s repertoire to build offender strengths and by so doing reduce risk in
a way that is respectful of their specific interests and goals. The ethical requirement that
therapists demonstrate respect for offenders (and others) is likely to make it easier to build a
sound therapeutic relationship with them, and also to ensure that the capabilities individuals
need to both pursue their personal goals and to reduce their risk to the community are
acquired. In other words, a human rights perspective intended to support the basic conditions
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for offender agency is able to ensure successfully a focus on the necessary components of
therapy as revealed by empirical research and take into account the inherent value of
offenders*as human rights holders.
Community protection versus offenders’ wellbeing
It is important to grasp that offenders can be human rights-violators, duty-bearers and also
human rights-holders all at the same time. The fact that sex offenders have often violated the
human rights of their victims is reflected in their punishment and loss of liberty. It is possible
to see strengths-based rehabilitation as concerned centrally with all three rights issues.
Providing individuals with the core skills that underpin their agency, freedom and wellbeing
should both promote their capacity to achieve good lives and also reduce their risk to others
(Ward & Gannon, 2006; Ward & Maruna, 2007; Ward & Stewart, 2003). Furthermore,
modules such as empathy training, cognitive skills, understanding the offence process, social
skills and intimacy training and emotional regulation are concerned directly with facilitating
offenders’ abilities to accurately infer, respond to and appreciate the experiences and needs of
others. The acquisition of the capabilities to improve the quality of their own lives and to
respect those of others will necessarily involve recognition of the freedom and well-being of
other people: their human rights. By extending human rights and related protections to sex
offenders, I do not see any infringement on the public’s rights to safety: rights imply duties,
and whatever entitlements are extended to sexual offenders these should always be balanced
against the core interests and basic human rights of others and the safety of the community at
large. While it is a mistake to privilege the rights of sex offenders over those of the community,
it is an equal error to automatically dismiss their rights to basic goods as irrelevant or
undeserved. It is certainly appropriate to punish sex offenders, but punishment should be
implemented in a way that respects their moral status as human rights holders and holds out
the possibility of re-entry into the human community. Therefore, a human rights ethical
perspective in conjunction with a strengths-based approach to rehabilitation is able to balance
the interests of both the community and those of sex offenders. There is, indeed, a middle way
here where restrictions on the freedom rights of offenders are carefully considered and
justified. It is a question of balance and it should not be assumed that any interests of the
community will always eclipse the interests and rights of sex offenders.
Conclusions
I have argued that human rights can be construed usefully as protecting the core conditions of
human agency and therefore human dignity. The provision of the internal and external
conditions required to ensure that individuals can identify and evaluate their personal goals,
establish how to achieve them and to coordinate their various aims into coordinated plans
ought to be a major focus of sex offender treatment. In this sense human rights and an
associated strengths-based approach can be a useful framework for organizing the assessment,
treatment and ongoing monitoring of sex offenders. Furthermore, it can help clinicians to
navigate effectively a middle path through four current practice dilemmas. It is a mistake to
separate the normative and factual components of treatment. The employment of assessment
and treatment techniques are always in the service of prudential (well-being), moral,
epistemic (knowledge) and social values. The fact that there has been a failure to acknowledge
the value dimensions of therapy has not helped our field to progress. It is time to accept that
ethical concepts such as human rights can assist us to respond to what is truly of value in
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offenders while keeping us focused upon their potential for harm. Offenders are human rights
holders and violators and we should be careful that, in our understandable enthusiasm to
protect the rights of victims and other members of the community, we do not violate
unwittingly the rights of those with whom we work.
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